The 2025 Distressed Investing Conference

Welcome to the 166th Pari Passu newsletter (and the 1st of 2026),

We are kicking off the year with a thrilling edition: a recap of the 32nd Annual Distressed Investing Conference. With a heavier focus on the lawyers’ perspective, this event was rich with debate on an intricate level, which we are excited to cover. One of our analysts attended the conference in person, and we are excited to share key insights and analysis!

Last year’s 2024 Distressed Investing Conference painted a picture of an industry undergoing rapid change. This year, we build on many of the themes introduced in last year’s debates, including the continued evolution of LMEs, private credit’s increasing presence in the restructuring space, and cross-border regime developments. We know this writeup is on the longer side, but we deliberately opted for much deeper coverage on each panel to give a comprehensive summary of the conference. We also covered the conference in chronological order to mimic the live experience, so feel free to skip around to topics that interest you the most; this writeup does not have to be read linearly for valuable insights! 

Special thanks to Will Etchison and the Beard Group for hosting and for inviting us to participate in person. Their work in bringing the industry together each year creates an invaluable forum for learning, debate, and connection. 

Steve Gidumal (President and Managing Partner, Virtus Capital, LP)

The session opened with Steve Gidumal’s recap of the past year, framed around his core thesis that the United States is the world’s only true economic superpower. He attributed America’s comprehensive advantage to many factors. First, unparalleled freedom of thought and innovation, as well as the practical benefits of speaking the world’s universal business language, English, enables businesses to commercialize ideas faster and attract global investment with fewer barriers. Then, Gidumal highlighted the US banking system as uniquely dynamic and resilient, emphasizing that it has repeatedly reinvented itself from the dominance of savings and loan institutions in the 1960s to the rise of regional and local banks in the 1980s; this dynamism reflects a system designed to evolve rather than stagnate. This flexibility, paired with broad access to credit (anyone can get a loan), creates a launch pad for entrepreneurship. Moreover, the US also benefits from what Gidumal called the “least bad” legal system. While imperfect, the US legal system allows for redemption, a foundational principle of restructuring and historical ethos that dates back to early American settlers fleeing debtor’s prisons. Overlaying this is America’s abundance of natural resources, including energy, minerals, and even education, all of which serve as the backbone of the US economic leverage.

Gidumal then pivoted to the question of tariffs and whether an economic superpower like the US truly benefits from free trade. Although economic theory suggests that all nations gain from free trade, he argued that the theory breaks down because it assumes a world without conflict. In reality, national advantage depends not just on cost-efficient trade but on the ability to sustain oneself during wartime or geopolitical disruption. The COVID-era shortages of key pharmaceuticals from China revealed the fragility of US supply chains and challenged the notion that the US has maintained its historic wartime advantage. As for market reactions, he argued that if tariffs are economically harmful, equity markets will fall when they are implemented. 

Turning to the broader macro environment, Gidumal underscored the strength of the US economy, citing GDP growth of +19.2% from 2024 to 2025, and characterized this distressed conference as one that consistently identifies emerging themes months in advance. Examples of such topics in the past years include waning enthusiasm for electric vehicles, the prospect of federal debt reaching $40tr, the impact of rising interest rates on home affordability, and the policy debate surrounding Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s potential exit from conservatorship, all of which have rapidly become central to macroeconomic discussion. Even China’s mounting economic problems now loom large in assessing global financial risk. In Gidumal’s view, these developments reinforce the argument that while global conditions shift, the structural advantages underpinning US economic power remain unparalleled.

For the rest of the conference content, we will structure this writeup by the broader thematic categories that framed each panel’s discussions.

Randall Eisenberg, Partner & Managing Director, AlixPartners (Moderator) - View Bio​Gabe Sasson, Partner, Paul Hastings - View Bio
Adrienne Walker, Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP - View Bio
Andrew Turnbull, Managing Director, Houlihan Lokey - View Bio

Following opening remarks and an overview of the current macro landscape, the panel began by first recapping our general restructuring environment: large Chapter 11 filings slowed during the first four months of 2025, picked up in Q2, and then plateaued in Q3; LMEs continue to dominate; and distressed exchanges have prevailed as a form of resolution, outpacing both payment defaults and in-court filings. These trends have arisen primarily due to the availability of private credit and the perception that LMEs are cheaper and less complex than Chapter 11s.

Then, panelists started with a discussion of today’s healthcare distress landscape: a system where reimbursement is structurally misaligned with delivery costs, federal and state funding headwinds being exacerbated under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), and providers across subsectors facing higher costs and regulatory complexity. A common thread across all conversations was that the current state of distress is underpinned by two main factors: changes in legislation relating to healthcare and high operational costs across the industry. The panel covered topics ranging from reimbursement-driven distress and subsector-specific vulnerabilities to the role of private equity in healthcare, many of which parallel the themes we have analyzed in our recent healthcare distress writeups such as BetterHealth. 

OBBBA Overview: Much of the panel’s discussion centered on how the OBBBA is reshaping the healthcare landscape by cutting federal support, tightening eligibility, and pressuring provider finances, so it is first important to understand what this bill is. For those who are unfamiliar with the OBBBA, it is a sweeping federal budget reconciliation law that combines tax, spending, and healthcare policy changes and was signed into law in July 2025. Among its many provisions, it makes significant cuts to federal healthcare programs and is one of the largest rollbacks of federal healthcare support in recent history [1]. On the federal level, an estimated $900bn in spending cuts is expected to take place over the next decade; on the state level, major holes will be created with Medicaid funding as the OBBBA cuts off new provider taxes and reduces existing ones. As one panelist cited, with “nearly one in four hospitals already distressed,” these cuts threaten to push many providers (particularly safety-net hospitals and those reliant on Medicaid) past the point of viability. The bottom line was how healthcare in the US remains expensive and inefficient: Medicare and Medicaid are representing an increasing percentage of national health expenditures, but reimbursement rates fail to match hospital delivery service rates. 

Healthcare subsectors with the highest levels of distress: Against this backdrop, Walker gave an overview of the healthcare subsectors with the highest levels of distress. She outlined three subsectors: senior living, hospital systems, and home health. However, senior living distress dominated much of the panel’s discussions due to its continued distress over the past years. The panel described senior living facilities as inclusive of continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs), senior skilled nursing, and long-term care facilities, citing that this subsector represents around 40% of all healthcare bankruptcies, a figure that does not include out-of-court transactions. Recent examples include the filings of Pacifica Senior Living (March 2025) and Genesis HealthCare (July 2025). Blackstone Real Estate’s November 2025 exit from its 9,000-unit senior living portfolio at a $600mm loss also reinforces how challenging this space has become for both operators and investors. As we explained earlier, reimbursement rates are down (especially after the OBBBA was signed) but costs have stayed high, with the primary drivers of high costs being rising labor costs, real estate and hospitality-related expenses (there is a shift in patient preferences, with many seniors wanting more activity facilities such as pickleball courts), and a misalignment between cost structure and reimbursement dynamics exacerbated by the OBBBA. Walker pointed out that the many sub-industries wrapped up in the senior living category further complicate this model. However, while this subsector is seeing high levels of distress, it is also experiencing record highs in occupancy rates, with over 90% average occupancy in independent living units. Yet, there is still distress due to the operational factors we just mentioned. The two other subsectors facing distress (hospital systems and home health services) also have cost-intensive delivery services and struggle with the same reimbursement rate deficiencies that challenge senior living facilities. 

Distress signals investors should look out for: With there being so much distress activity in healthcare, the panel then turned to two signals investors should watch out for. First was revenue, and the biggest questions here were (1) what are the sources of revenue, and (2) how much exposure does the company have to government policy changes and supplemental funding? With the OBBBA impacting several funding aspects, the second point becomes critical. Hospitals and other healthcare facilities are not widget-makers, and facilities exist in market-specific environments heavily influenced by their local state laws. Thus, healthcare providers (and in turn, investors) that rely heavily on Medicaid must understand state-level supplemental funding for a few reasons:

(2a) Supplemental payments come from the state, not the federal government. Each state decides how much money it gives certain providers to compensate for low Medicaid base rates. 

(2b) Each state assigns providers to a “provider class:” hospitals, nursing homes, health clinics, etc. Each class also gets different supplemental payments 

(2c) States often cap how much supplemental funding a class can receive. As such, it is important to know where your provider class’s current reimbursement rate measures up against the state cap. 

In addition to revenue, the panel also talked about expenses. Labor was by far the largest component, easily making up over 50% of total costs in this industry. An interesting observation that was made was the strong correlation between labor as a percentage of revenues and the provider’s credit rating. Finally, investors must also consider capex spend outside of opex. For non-public systems, the panel predicted around 3-4% of revenue to be allocated toward capex. While it is possible to temporarily delay capex spend, companies can’t hide from it forever; if not spent now, deferred capital will build up and compound financial strain in the long run. Critically, reimbursement rates heavily impact reinvestment potential, bringing the discussion back to the effects of the OBBBA. 

How hospitals should react to the changing political environment: Given these mounting financial pressures, many of which are intensified by the OBBBA, the panel then turned to how hospitals should navigate the evolving funding environment. Panelists outlined two main solutions to combat declining reimbursement: 

However, while combining services, outsourcing them, or eliminating them completely may seem like the most immediate or actionable relief measures, they may not be sufficient on their own and can create more serious harms that money cannot measure: though not explicitly mentioned at every turn, Walker took care to underscore that there is a very human element beneath all of this distressed talk. For example, maternity care is expensive, so hospitals may look to move this service elsewhere (either closing this unit entirely or consolidating it into another facility within the system). But 40% of all births in the US are covered by Medicaid, so if nearly half of the system is dependent on reimbursement, where will providers bridge the funding gap? If someone goes into labor, will their nearest hospital be able to provide them with the care they need to survive, or will they need to travel far for a service that has now been outsourced or eliminated completely? This is a central question providers must consider. Though tradeoffs must be made, it is vital to keep human lives at the forefront of all considerations. 

Role of private equity in healthcare: After highlighting distress signals and possible solutions to policy changes, the panel then turned to the role of private equity in healthcare given the increased scrutiny of a sponsor’s role when standards / availability of care decrease amidst rising financial pressures. Sasson noted that the current state of distress in the industry is not entirely attributable to PE, as much of the pressure stems from broader macro and operational headwinds we discussed earlier. Despite this, sponsors are often the first target of scrutiny when performance deteriorates. More generally, the private equity thesis of optimizing cost while increasing revenue is beginning to break down amidst funding cuts brought about by the OBBBA. The consensus here was that PE is still navigating its place within the changing political environment and society’s expectations, a task complicated by the fact that healthcare is fundamentally different from other businesses; the industry’s “products” are a service that addresses basic human survival. 

How investors are evaluating their options: The roundtable concluded with some final thoughts on how investors are currently looking at prospects. Considerations could be bucketed into three questions: 

Eli Vonnegut, Partner, Davis Polk​ (Moderator) - View Bio​
Paul Sandler, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP - View Bio
Sam Roberge, Managing Director, Ares Management - View Bio
Zachary Rosenbaum, Partner, Kobre & Kim - View Bio
Naomi Moss, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 

Before we dive into this panel, let’s do a quick review of what LMEs are and how they’ve grown to change over the years. Liability management exercises (LMEs) encompass a spectrum of mechanisms (both in and out of court) used by distressed companies to extend runway and / or reduce debt burdens. Historically, LMEs have fallen into two buckets: consensual and nonconsensual (“coercive”). On the consensual side, this includes amend-and-extend transactions, exchange offers, repurchases, equitizations, and asset sales. On the coercive side, loose credit docs have enabled sponsors and borrowers to pursue aggressive structures like drop-downs, uptiers, and variations of double dips; these transactions often trigger creditor-on-creditor violence and resulting litigation. With current docs still flexible, LMEs remain a central, but evolving, feature of modern restructuring. Speakers wished to remain anonymous to enable more candid discussion, and it was emphasized that all perspectives expressed were not representative of the panelists’ firms. 

How litigation shapes deal architecture: Following a brief recap of the ongoing Incora litigation, the panel turned to how modern deal design is influenced by litigation risk. For example, open market purchase (OMP) provisions have been aggressively pursued prior to Serta’s Fifth Circuit reversal. In Serta, the court held that the language surrounding OMPs were too vague. However, in a similar decision following closely after Serta, Mitel’s uptier was upheld due to the clear credit doc language and the transaction not relying on OMP language at all. In the post-Serta world, two major structural shifts have emerged. First, fewer transactions are relying on OMP language. Deals are increasingly taking on extend and exchange structures similar to BetterHealth, avoiding Serta-related language confusion entirely. Second, there is a greater willingness to broaden participation. In trend with increasing pro-rata participation from LME 1.0 to LME 2.0 and now in LME 3.0, transaction structures are shifting away from winner-takes-all dynamics. Sponsors are allowing more lenders into deals and exploring tiered considerations, all in an effort to reduce the threat of litigation. A prime example of this is City Brewing’s 2024 LME, where AHG and non-AHG creditors received 97c and 85c exchange rates, respectively, a deliberately narrow spread offered to broaden participation and decrease litigation risk. 

The LME triangle: Given this changing LME environment, panelists framed the investor’s perspective from three key questions: 

With regard to the third point, panelists noted how many investors in the post-Serta era have reassessed their portfolios to understand where similar vulnerabilities may exist with credit doc language. The consensus was to try to evaluate risk as early as possible; with higher risk situations (such as cases involving looser credit docs), it may be better to opt for a less aggressive approach to mitigate coercive, litigation-prone outcomes. Litigators are also entering the process much earlier in order to “stress test” transactions before they are executed, further emphasizing how much downside protection is prioritized when navigating litigation around credit docs. 

Aside from litigation-driven considerations, the biggest factor driving deal structures was how early groups were forming. This is where co-ops would have entered the conversation, but the panel deliberately steered clear of all discussions of co-ops, citing that the issue was too contentious. The panelists skirted carefully around the topic, describing how market participants have a better understanding of who else is in the cap stack. As a result of more in-depth considerations, negotiations could potentially become more complex and get dragged out. At the end of the day, we’re seeing a lot more LME activity compared to in-court filings, but it’s still important to keep in mind that LMEs are not a comprehensive solution to fix a company; as panelists noted, “one in five LMEs still end up in Chapter 11.”

The expanding role of private credit: It wouldn’t be an LME panel without an acknowledgement of private credit’s ever-expanding role in out of court workarounds. PC is showing up earlier and more aggressively in the current landscape, but whether or not PC capital is effective depends on what the business needs: if liquidity is a problem, PC can help significantly; if the company faces an upcoming maturity, PC can similarly provide bridge financing; but if a company needs deleveraging, PC is less effective. The panel also discussed reactions to PC’s involvement in LMEs. From a syndicated lender’s perspective, PC typically appears in two non-hostile scenarios: providing pari 1L capital when the 1L trades up despite some dilution, and entering with junior capital or preferred equity. But when PC becomes aggressive, existing lenders can leverage advantages such as offering maturity extensions, which PC cannot match. In the litigation matrix, PC becomes the obvious solution when the parties are not seeking a comprehensive all-creditor resolution. As one panelist summarized: “It’s all in the documents: no one cares if an uptier happens if the docs allow it.”

Market reactions, eliminating holdouts, and managing risk: The panel wrapped up LME discussions with a summary of how participants are reacting to recent changes in the LME landscape. Ambiguous concepts like unclear OMP language are disappearing as sponsors and lenders draft more precise definitions. However, the upper hand is still situation-dependent. For example, when many lenders are eager to participate, the company can progressively push for looser credit docs even if a few lenders drop out; while lenders prefer tighter docs, strong demand lets companies loosen docs in practice because they can still raise the needed capital Less punitive terms are also on the rise as persistent legal challenges and the time cost of litigation have forced both companies and lenders (particularly repeat players who have been on both sides of the table) to reconsider whether aggressive LMEs truly deliver long-term value. 

Stephanie Wickouski, Managing Director, Pivot > (Moderator) - View Bio​
Arielle Patrick, Incoming Managing Partner, Upland Workshop - View Bio
Candace Arthur, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP - View Bio
Julie Ann Lamm, Partner, Paul, Weiss

To take a brief step back from the restructuring context, this next panel turned to a discussion on corporate governance in an AI-driven environment. Two major themes that emerged were reputation exposure and information leakage risk. Panelists emphasized that many of the issues boards are encountering mirror past governance cycles (such as ESG and DEI) where companies launched committees or initiatives but failed to fully integrate those programs into daily operations. And finally, all panelists called for an end to AI notetakers as currently there is no comprehensive governance or regulatory framework around its usage.

Current state of AI adoption: This discussion was framed around words of caution. Panelists observed that, despite the discourse around “responsible AI usage,” many boards are repeating mistakes from the ESG era: forming oversight committees without embedding AI risk management into workflows. Several speakers were troubled by the mass adoption of AI notetakers (which are often overlooked as despite posing meaningful risks), which often produce misinformation, misattribute statements, or expose confidential information. A key governance point was that companies cannot rely on a “special AI team” siloed from the rest of the organization; overly centralized AI expertise can create blind spots across operational teams. Most importantly, the panel emphasized that there is nothing inherently wrong with or bad about AI usage. But at the end of the day, you can only regulate what you can see, so it is critical that organizations foster an environment where employees feel safe being transparent about their usage of AI. 

Risks with AI usage: The panel then dedicated a significant amount of time to the risks associated with feeding sensitive information into AI, highlighting how emergency financing or contract negotiation terms would clearly violate confidentiality provisions if entered into an AI system. They also raised legal questions about responsibility for AI-generated ideas, connecting the issue to broader debates on (the lack of) AI explainability. Further, panelists emphasized that AI has not changed fiduciary duties: boards cannot simply act on AI output without benchmarking recommendations against peer practices and industry standards, and plagiarism remains another all-encompassing risk. But the absence of explicit legal precedent does not convert AI-generated information into privileged material. Other industries, such as healthcare, have stricter guidelines for what can and cannot be fed into AI; for example, patient data is highly confidential and cannot be entered into such systems. While the legal regime in corporate governance has not caught up in other industries (such as finance-related fields and law), panelists predicted similar regulatory tightening in financial and legal contexts as AI tools proliferate. To mitigate risks, one suggestion was to expand the guidance of consultants and experts beyond just the board level into actual workflows. 

AI considerations for distressed vs solvent companies: For the most part, panelists agreed that the considerations for AI governance were largely industry and stage agnostic. However, stressed companies do face some unique situations that could either push them deeper into distress or increase liquidity. For the former situation, here’s a realistic chain of events outlined by one of the lawyers: a company adopts AI → contract breach occurs because of misuse → litigation ensues → costs of litigation push the company deeper into distress. For the latter situation, one possible use case is leveraging AI to reduce workflow costs, which could be a tempting option for distressed companies trying to free up cash. Yet this creates a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dynamic: if a distressed company does not adopt AI for cost savings, certain stakeholders could raise criticisms of inefficiency; if it does adopt AI, the company could risk backlash for replacing human labor and may separately trigger litigation if the AI usage violates contractual obligations. 

Practical applications of AI in law firms today: The panel concluded with a discussion of AI adoption in law firms. Latham is actively using AI for diligence and drafting, while Paul, Weiss uses both third-party AI platforms and a firm-specific model. One of the largest open questions is how client consent will be managed: Will firms require consent only from new clients, or will existing clients retroactively need to approve AI usage? The legal system has not yet caught up with these questions, but panelists expect growing pressure from clients who prefer AI usage to reduce costs, particularly because many legal services are billed hourly. 

Andy Dietderich, Partner, Sullivan & Cromwell (Moderator) - View Bio
Michael Kaplan, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge, District of New Jersey - View Bio
Ken Ziman, Partner, Paul, Weiss - View Bio
Charles Mullin, PhD, Chair, Partner, Bates White - View Bio
Michael Torkin, Partner, Linklaters LLP

This panel intentionally excluded creditor-side representation to focus solely on how corporate decision-makers evaluate whether to resolve mass torts through Chapter 11 or alternative avenues such as multidistrict litigation (MDL), both of which we will explain in depth shortly. Panelists opened with data from the US Chamber of Commerce showing that domestic businesses paid roughly $300bn in tort settlements in 2022, yet the process remains highly inefficient: only about 43c on the dollar reaches victims, with the remainder lost to transaction costs. Mass tort bankruptcies themselves have produced mixed results and are often long, expensive, and unpredictable. Against a backdrop where balance sheet issues are increasingly solved through LMEs, the panel posed a central question: why are mass torts still so difficult to resolve efficiently in bankruptcy?

To frame this answer, Mullin posed four foundational questions: 

Importance of understanding corporate structure and related indemnification: Regarding the last point, the panel then addressed where liability actually sits within corporate structures. Drawing on examples like the Federal-Mogul asbestos bankruptcy, panelists emphasized the need to distinguish between liabilities created by a parent’s own conduct and those inherited through acquisition; this distinction matters because a parent may be directly liable for its own conduct, whereas liabilities inherited through acquisition could remain legally anchored in the acquired subsidiary unless specific guarantees, indemnities, or veil-piercing theories bring the parent into the responsibility chain. Lessons from the mortgage crisis further showed that some structures successfully limited parent-level exposure while others invited broader claims. These questions frequently give rise to disputes over parent liability and the scope of third-party releases, issues that remain central to modern mass-tort bankruptcy practice. Building on this, the panel then turned to how corporate structure itself can shape mass-tort outcomes, noting that Delaware’s strict veil-piercing rules make the parent / subsidiary relationship a critical point of analysis. While shared services, centralized management, consolidated cash systems, and parent-level insurance programs are routine corporate features, plaintiffs can use these touchpoints to argue that the parent should be drawn into the tort system. Intellectual property assets add another layer of risk: although housing IP in a single entity offers clear economic benefits, transfers made during insolvency can trigger fraudulent conveyance charges.

Pros and cons of dealing with torts in an MDL vs. Chapter 11: Introducing the topic of settling torts in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Torkin first emphasized that resolving mass torts is fundamentally more complex and less predictable than resolving capital-structure problems such as LMEs, largely because companies often lack the data needed to quantify the NPV of future claims. Asbestos remains the only tort category with over four decades of reliable injury-related evidence, whereas areas like PFAS have far less clarity. Decisions predicated on nascent data and / or evolving regulatory frameworks complicates both strategic planning and the selection between two primary pathways for resolving mass torts: multidistrict litigation (MDL) and Chapter 11.

The rest of this discussion was led by Judge Kaplan, who compared the benefits and drawbacks of both systems. First, he started with multidistrict litigation. MDLs aggregate mass tort cases filed around the country and send them to one federal judge so the cases can move through discovery and pretrial proceedings, after which cases (in theory) return to their original courts for trial [2]. In practice, fewer than 5% of cases ever do. Judge Kaplan noted that MDLs can be effective under the right conditions. MDLs work best for mature torts with robust data, minimal latency period (the time between exposure and injury), and a clearly identifiable plaintiff population. NFL concussion cases or the 3M earplugs litigation are examples of when MDLs would be most effective. In these settings, MDLs promote efficiency by consolidating discovery, enabling mediation, and allowing individual rights to advance through trial if necessary. However, MDLs struggle when claims depend on injuries with long latency periods or when data is sparse (as in emerging PFAS litigation).

By contrast, Chapter 11 offers tools that MDLs lack, particularly when dealing with the scale and complexity of modern mass tort liabilities. One of the biggest benefits of Chapter 11 is the automatic stay, which halts thousands of concurrent actions, including parallel state-court, federal-court, and class-action proceedings that often overwhelm companies like LTL Management at the time of filing. Most importantly, Chapter 11 provides a mechanism to address future claims (such as resolving future asbestos-related claims through Section 524(g)) [9], something MDLs cannot do; this is particularly helpful for torts with long latency periods where future claimants have not yet manifested injury. Additionally, Section 157(b)(5) enables personal injury claims to be consolidated in a single federal forum during Chapter 11, which helps ensure consistent treatment [3]. These features make Chapter 11 especially valuable for companies facing not only mass-tort liability but also operational, footprint, or challenges related to their cap stack, as illustrated by recent Rite Aid litigation, where MDL mechanisms alone would not have resolved underlying operational issues. However, in-court filings can be time consuming and expensive, so companies should weigh the benefits against these financial and procedural burdens.

Our takeaway from this analysis was that neither forum offers a perfect solution, but both can be leveraged in different situations. MDLs can be a powerful tool for mature torts with robust data, but they are ill-suited for future claims or cases intertwined with broader corporate distress. Chapter 11 provides centralization and the ability to bind future claimants, but its cost and unpredictability make it viable only when the scale and complexity of litigation demand a comprehensive restructuring framework.

Emil Kleinhaus, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Moderator) - View Bio​
Doug Mannal, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP - View Bio
Mark Hebbeln, Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP - View Bio​
Phil Anker, Partner, WilmerHale - View Bio

This was one of the most contentious discussions of the conference, with panelists debating the future of make-wholes. The focus was on whether lenders in Chapter 11 can enforce make-whole premiums, especially when they are oversecured, and whether new deal structures are being used to replicate make-wholes in ways that can survive Bankruptcy Code limitations, such as in Section 502(b)(2). The nature of make-wholes is highly technical, but don’t worry as we will break down all of the legal jargon as we cover this panel’s debate. As with the LME discussion, panelists asked to remain anonymous.